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LEGISLATION
EFFECT OF TENANT'S BANKRUPTCY ON PENNSYLVANIA LANDLORD'S
CLAIM FOR RENT-Where the Pennsylvania landlord, claiming rent in
arrears upon the bankruptcy of his tenant,' seeks the aid of the federal courts
under the Bankruptcy Act,2 a determination of the rights involved will depend
primarily, of course, upon the law as stated in the Act, but also upon the exist-
ing state laws to the extent that the Bankruptcy Act does not completely con-
trol.
3
The landlord, upon the bankruptcy of his tenant, is, of course, anxious that
his claim be paid in full out of the bankrupt's estate. If he can prove that
his claim amounts to a lien under Section 67 (d) of the Bankruptcy Act,4 the
probability of accomplishing this purpose is greatest. Claims proved under this
section must be discharged in full, if possible, out of the proceeds of the sale
of the property subject to the lien, the only priority being the cost necessarily
incident to the preservation of the particular estate, its conversion into money,
and payment thereof to the lienor.5 The section reads:
"Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or
in fraud upon the provisions of this title, and for a present consideration,
which have been recorded according to law, if record thereof was neces-
sary in order to impart notice, shall, to the extent of such present consid-
eration only, not be affected by anything herein."
Failure to prove his claim under the above section will not necessarily, how-
ever, leave the landlord among the rank and file of general creditors. Sec-
tion 64 (b) (5) of the Act" provides:
"debts to have priority . . . and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates
_ . . shall be . . . (5) debts owing to any person who by the laws of
the states or the United States is entitled to priority."
Under this section the landlord is entitled to priority over claims not specified
in the same section as being higher in right.7  Those so specified include taxes,
the costs of preserving the estate, creditors' filing fees, administration expenses,
and wages earned within the three months preceding the bankruptcy.
Whether the landlord can prove that he has a lien, under Section 67 (d),
or that he is entitled to priority over general creditors, under Section 64 (b)
(5), depends entirely upon the laws of the respective states,-that is, in any
given instance the relationship which the landlord's claim will bear to others
will depend upon the law of the jurisdiction in which the leased premises are
situated. Section 67 (d) has been so construed by virtue of its words "accord-
ing to law" 8 and Section 64 (b) (5) expressly so provides.9
'No attempt will be made to deal with the status of claims in bankruptcy for rent
accruing after the filing of the petition. A recent article dealing with this question is that
by W. S. Schwabacker and S. C. Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1933) 33 COL. L.
REv. 213. See also infra note 22.
230 STAT. 544, II U. S. C. A. § i (1927).
'Among such state laws are included those relating to the title to property, exemp-
tions, and the order of priority of debts. See i REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (1923) §§ 5-7.
'36 STAT. 842, 11 U. S. C. A. § 3O7 (d) (1927).
In re Rauch et al., 226 Fed. 982 (E. D. Va. 1915).
030 STAT. 563, "1 U. S. C. A. § 304 (b) (5) (1926).
in re Consumers' Coffee Co., 151 Fed. 933, 20 A. B. R. 835 (E. D. Pa. 19o7).
0 Holt v. Crucible Steel Co., 224 U. S. 262, 32 Sup. Ct. 414, 27 A. B. R. 856 (1912).
The words used are "debts owing to any person who by the laws of the states . .
(48)
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Turning, therefore, to the laws of Pennsylvania, it is found that any right
of the landlord to a priority or lien is dependent upon the ancient common law
remedy of distress.1 This remedy, in medieval England, entitled the feudal
lord to take any goods of the tenant found on the leased premises and hold them
as a gage, or pledge, to induce the tenant to pay what he owed." In i69g , the
remedy was broadened by statute 1 2 so that the landlord, upon complying with
certain conditions, 13 could sell the goods in order to satisfy the debt. Again,
in 1709, a further enactment 1 4 provided that no goods on leased lands should
be taken in execution unless the party at whose suit the execution was sued
paid to the landlord, before removing the goods, the arrears of rent up to but
not exceeding the amount of one year's rent due at the time of the execution.
The purpose of this statute was to mitigate the hardship to the landlord of the
operation of the common law rule that goods in the custody of the law were
not distrainable.' 5
Partly because the right to distrain is so nearly extrajudicial in its nature,
giving the landlord a right amounting to that of self-help, it has not been uni-
versally accepted by the states of the United States.' 6 Pennsylvania, however,
did adopt it, and in 1772 a statute very similar to the English Act of 1690 was
passed,' 7 and in 1836 one similar to the English Act of 1709.-18 Both of these
statutes are in force today.'
9
Approaching at this point the factual situations, it is found that if the
landlord has distrained prior to the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings,
he is held to have established a valid lien upon the goods distrained for the
full amount of the rent in arrears.
2 0  Furthermore, if, prior to the bankruptcy,
an execution is levied upon the tenant's goods on the leased premises, the land-
lord, under the Act of 1836,1 is regarded as having a lien on the goods to
the extent of one year's rent in arrears.
2 2  Both of these liens are recognized
in bankruptcy proceedings in the federal courts,
2 and this is true even though
10ENEVER, DISTRESS (1931) 67; GILBERT, DISTRESSES (4th ed. 1823) 4.
z' ENEVER, op. cit. supra note IO, at 7; 2 TIFFANY, LANIPLORD AND TENANT (19IO) §.325.
2 W. & M. c. 5, §2 (16go).
A short period of time, five days, was given the tenant or owner of the goods in
which to replevy with sufficient security, failing which the distrainor desiring to sell the
goods was to cause them to be appraised by two sworn appraisers. The goods then could
be sold.
148 ANNE, c. 14, § 1 (709).
2ENEVER, op. cit. supra note io, at 226. For a Pennsylvania case dealing with the
operation of this rule see Pierce v. Scott, 4 W. & S. 344 (Pa. 1842) ; also infra note 55.
" For a summary of the status of the right in the various states see 2 TIFFANY, op. Cit.
supra note II, at 1987.
"PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 68, § 291.
"PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 68, § 321.
"PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 68, §§ 291 and 321.
OIn re Hoover, 113 Fed. 136, 7 A. B. R. 33d (W. D. Pa. 19o2).
fSupra notes 18 and 19.
0Shalet v. Klauder, 34 F. (2d) 594, 7 A. B. R. (N. s.) 50, (C. C. A. 3d, 1929);
In re Mt. Winans Lbr. Co., =8 Fed. 831 (D. Md. 1915). (The Maryland statute is also
based on the Statute of 8 ANNE, c. 14, § I). Furthermore, and the question is somewhat
similar to that mentioned supra note 3, the courts of Pennsylvania have given the Act of
1836 the construction that a covenant for rent payable in advance, or a stipulation in a
lease that on breach of a covenant the whole rent for the balance of the term shall at once
become due is within the terms of the statute "money due for rent at the time of taking
such goods" and also is within the class of "debts owing to any person," which, under
Section 64 (b) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, priority is enforced when awarded by state
law. Such covenants not being against public policy, are sustained to the extent of giving
the landlord priority for one year's rent: Collins' Appeal, 35 Pa. 83 (186o) ; Platt Barber
Co. v. Johnston, 168 Pa. 47, 31 AtI. 935 (1895) ; fi re Keith-Gara Co., 203 Fed. 585 (E. D.
Pa. 1913).
See supra notes 21 and 22.
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they were perfected within the four months next preceding the institution of
the bankruptcy proceedings.2 4 But where the landlord has failed to distrain,
and there has been no execution levied, the landlord's right to a preferred posi-
tion is not readily apparent.
Upon institution of bankruptcy proceedings, the bankrupt tenant's goods
pass into the custody of the law, as represented by the trustee,25 and the land-
lord's right to distrain is cut off by operation of the common law rule that goods
in the custody of the law are not distrainable. 26  Therefore, in order to assert
his claim to a preference under the Act of 1836,27 the landlord must proceed
upon the theory that bankruptcy proceedings are equivalent to an execution.
The law as it developed with regard to the soundness of this theory is of con-
siderable interest.
The question whether bankruptcy proceedings could be regarded as an
execution arose in 1874 in the case of Longstreth v. Pennock.25 In that case the
Supreme Court of the United States held that bankruptcy proceedings came
"within the equity of the statute," adding that the question was one "belonging
to the local law of Pennsylvania". The latter phrase is particularly significant
in that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had, earlier in the same year, de-
cided that the statute did not operate in favor of the landlord in sales by
receivers appointed on a bill in equity.29 This situation was so closely akin
to that before the Supreme Court of the United States that it should have
been determinative of the question, 0 but apparently the local case was not
brought to the attention of the Supreme Court.3 ' The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, however, again considered the same question in 1916,12 and, after
pointing out that the statute was in derogation of the common law and should
be strictly construed, once more held that the statute did not help the landlord.
In a subsequent bankruptcy case, Rosenblum v. Uber 33 the trustee and referee
felt bound by the local law and refused to follow the result reached by the
Supreme Court of the United States. This holding was affirmed without fur-
ther opinion by the district court,34 but was reversed by the circuit court of
appeals, 9 not merely upon the earlier theory that the case was within the
equity of the statute, but also because the court felt that a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding was in essence an execution. Whether this last decision was cor-
rect, 36 however, became a matter of purely academic interest, inasmuch as the
legislature of Pennsylvania in 1919 enacted a companion statute to that of
1836 specifically covering the bankruptcy situation.37 It reads in part:
'Under the Bankruptcy Act, Section 67 (f), preferences acquired by legal proceed-
ings within four months of the institution of the bankruptcy are declared invalid. The
courts, however, have held, that a distress levy is not a legal proceeding within the intend-
ment of the Act. In the Matter of Rowe & Bros., Inc., 18 F. (2d) 958, 9 A. B. R. (N. s.)
140 (W. D. Pa., 1927); fit re Abbruzzo, 276 Fed. 405 (W. D. Pa., 1921); City of Rich-
mond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 175, 39 Sup. Ct. 186 (1918).
z36 STAT. 840, ii U. S. C. A. §75 (2) (1927).
"See supra note 16.
"See supra notes 18 and ig.
287 U. S. 575 (1874).
"Singerly v. Fox, 75 Pa. 112 (1874).
'The construction adopted by the state supreme court should control in such a situa-
tion. City of Richmond v. Bird, supra note 24.
'The state decision, handed down in January, might not have been published by the
fall of the same year.
"Grayson v. Aiman, 252 Pa. 461, 97 Atl. 695 (1916).
Entitled in the District Court, Matter of Stem, 256 Fed. 584, 41 A. B. R. 712 (W. D.
Pa. 1918).
"See supra note 33.
"256 Fed. 584 (W. D. Pa. 1919).
"The reasoning of the upper court was little more than dogmatic and does not seem to
have been as logical as that of the referee.
' PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 39, § 96.
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"In all cases where a tenant or tenants become insolvent . . . or
bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings are instituted either by or
against the tenant or tenants, covering goods and chattels upon demised
premises and which are liable to distress by the landlord for rent, the land-
lord shall be first entitled to receive out of the proceeds of the sale of such
goods and chattels by the legal representatives of the tenant any sum or
sums of money due the landlord for rent of such demised premises at the
time of the institution of the . . . proceedings, not exceeding one year's
rent. . "
This statute is of course a complete answer to the referee's contention in Rosen-
blum v. Uber, and clearly entities the landlord's claim to priority at least.""
The further question remains whether under this statute the landlord can
successfully establish a claim to a lien on the bankrupt's goods found on the
leased premises. This did not arise directly until i931. It is doubtful if prior
to that time the actual significance of the question had been even realized.
The language used in several decisions 39 indicates a total obliviousness to the
situation. It is only recently that there has been any question whether the
landlord's claim actually constitutes a lien. The importance of the point was
first recognized in cases where the bankrupt's estate was insufficient to pay in
full those creditors whose claims were entitled to priority under Section 64
(b) (5).40
On January 16, J931, the Federal District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania held, in the case of In re Hoopert,41 that the landlord's claim
for rent was payable in full from the proceeds of the bankrupt's personalty
located on the leased premises in preference to administration expenses, which
under Section 64 (b) should take priority over the landlord's claim. The
same court, when the question again arose in July, 1931, reached an exactly
opposite result, -2 but without reference to the earlier decision. It is interest-
ing to note that the earlier opinion did not at any point indicate that the court
realized that it was actually according to the landlord the rights of a lienor,
whereas the latter opinion dealt directly with the question whether, under the
Pennsylvania law, the landlord who has not distrained has a lien within the
meaning of Section 67 (d). The latter opinion, therefore, at once commends
itself because of the clearer perception of the problem involved. 43  In order to
reach any conclusion on the merits of the problem, however, the matter should
be considered further.
It has been argued that Section 67 (d), because of its very phraseology,
could apply to only voluntary liens.4   The great weight of authority, however,
'For bankruptcy interpretations of the Statute of 8 ANNE in other jurisdictions see:
In re Wall, 6o F. (2d) 573, 21 A. B. R. (N. s.) 434 (E. D. Miss. 1932); In re Bishop,
153 Fed. 304, 18 A. B. R. 635 (D. S. C. 19o7) ; It re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673 (C. C. A. 6th,
19o7) ; In re Mitchell, 116 Fed. 87, 8 A. B. R. 324 (D. Del. 19o2) ; In re Chaudron & Peyton,
i8o Fed. 841, 24 A. B. R. 811 (D. Md. 1911).
I Shalet v. Klauder, supra note 22, at 595,-"the landlord had not distrained on the
goods when the levy of the sheriff was made. After that it was too late to distrain, but
the landlord was not left without a remedy. He could have given notice to the sheriff of
his claim for rent for one year, and his right to distrain would thereby have become a
lien." In effect the holding in In re Morris, 159 Fed. 591, ig A. B. R. 781 (M. D. Pa.
19o8) grants a lien. And see In re Hoopert, infra note 41.
o See supra text following note 8.
a58F. (2d) 349 (M. D. Pa. 1931).
In re Philbin, 53 F. (:2d) 218 (M. D. Pa. 1931).
'The decision in In re Hoopert, by Judge Johnson, merely cites a number of earlier
cases which involved the right to priority and others in which there had been actual distress
levies.
"Because only such liens can be said to be "'given or accepted in good faith" for a
present consideration.
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is to the effect that it applies also to statutory liens.45 At common law a lien
involved the bare right to possession of the goods subject thereto. 46 By statute
this right has been generally enlarged to include the power of sale.4 7  Unfor-
tunately, the word lien covers so broad a field that there is no hard and fast
definition to which to turn. As a recent writer has expressed it: 48
"the word lien has not succeeded in attaining any fixed application as a
technical term of English law. Its use is capricious and uncertain."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Singerly v. Fox,49 in
speaking of the 1836 statute, said:
"The Act of Assembly requires the sheriff to pay out of the pro-
ceeds of his levy and sale of the tenant's goods to the landlord a sum not
exceeding one year's rent, but this is by virtue of the directions of the
act in that special case, and not because of any lien. This act is no doubt
based upon the idea that it would be inequitable to take from the landlord
that which he regarded as the security for his rent, and which he might
at any time seize by virtue of his warrant."
Furthermore, there are decisions by lower Pennsylvania courts dealing with
the manner in which the landlord can enforce his rights under the statute.
These decisions do not give the landlord a right to proceed against the goods,
but hold that his action must be brought against the sheriff if he fails to pay
the landlord's claim out of the proceeds of the sale. 0 In short, the sheriff can
sell the chattels free and clear of any claim on them by the landlord.," These
cases are not reconcilable with the existence of a lien.
5 2
The argument that there is a lien finds its basis, for the most part, in a
statement that
"Whenever the law gives a creditor a right to have a debt satisfied
from the proceeds of property or before the property can be otherwise
disposed of, it gives a lien on such property to secure the payment of this
debt." 58
This statement, however, is loosely phrased and may easily be misconstrued.
As already pointed out, the early failure to appreciate the problem involved,
resulting as it did in a misuse of terms, is also responsible for some of the
difficulty. On the whole, it seems patent that the only conclusion possible is
that the statute, as construed by the Pennsylvania courts, does not create a lien
in favor of the landlord. The decision in the Hoopert case is regrettable. It
could have resulted only from a failure to appreciate the fundamental problems
involved.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the right to distrain is not alto-
gether an instrumentality to enable the landlord to close down upon his unfor-
tunate tenant. It serves, on the other hand, as the credit basis on which many
City of Richmond v. Bird, supra note 24; It re San Joaquin Pacldng Co., 295 Fed.
312, 4 A. B. R. (N. s.) 37 (C. C. A. 9th, i9"-4). Contra: In re Cramond, 145 Fed. 966, i7
A. B. R. 22 (N. D. N1. Y. i9o6).
4i JONES, LIEIrs (3d ed. 1914) c. I.
'7 Ibid. c. 3.
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (6th ed. 1920) 4o2, n. 3.
'Supra note 29.
'West, Adm. v. Sink, 2 Yeates 274 (Pa. 1798); Allen v. Lewis, i Ashm. 184 (Pa.
1827) ; Fisher v. Allen, 2 Phila. 115 (i856).
ISchuyler v. Phila. Coach Co., 29 W. N. C. 343 (Pa. i89i).
uFor a lien to exist the landlord's claim should be a charge against the goods or the
proceeds.
I Chase, C. J., It re Wynne, Chase 22y (C. C. D. Va. i867).
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persons are enabled to secure a lease. The right would not have survived so
long if it did not serve a useful purpose. It seems only proper, therefore, that
where the landlord loses his right to distrain he be granted special considera-
tion to compensate him for this loss. Such special consideration is given him
in the bankruptcy situation under the Pennsylvania law,"4 although it cannot
be said that his claim amounts to a lien.
R.L.L.
"It is of interest to note here an analogous situation in which the landlord is held to
lose his right to distrain:
On the death of a tenant the lease continues to exist as an asset of the estate,
Wartanian's Est., 305 Pa. 333, 157 Atl. 688 (i93i), but because of the decedents' estates
statute, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 2o, § 5oi, which fixes the order of payment of
decedent's debts, it was held in Gandy v. Dickson, i66 Pa. 422, 31 Atl. i27 (1895) that
the landlord loses his right to distrain on the goods of the deceased tenant. The reason
given was that if distraint were allowed the order of payment fixed by the statute would
be disturbed. Inasmuch, however, as the statute entitles the landlord to priority for "rents
not exceeding one year", here too the landlord is given special consideration.
